University of Vermont

UVM ScholarWorks
Graduate College Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

2008

The Compression and Expansion of Musical Experience in the
Digital Age
Jesse Lawson
University of Vermont

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis

Recommended Citation
Lawson, Jesse, "The Compression and Expansion of Musical Experience in the Digital Age" (2008).
Graduate College Dissertations and Theses. 133.
https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/graddis/133

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at UVM ScholarWorks. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate College Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of
UVM ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uvm.edu.

THE COMPRESSION AND EXPANSION OF MUSICAL EXPERIENCE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE

A Thesis Presented
by
Jesse Lawson
to
The Faculty of the Graduate College
of
The University of Vermont

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts
Specializing in English
October, 2008

Accepted by the Faculty of the Graduate College, The University of Vermont, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
specializing in English.

Thesis ~xamj,&~ommittee:

. Advisor

I

.Jtr!rf~ ~ e na d Ill L.D.

/ /
4 11ot-11 - Fh,-I?.
n..
91
:.5. ?,:rs,~::l.rr,

,
.

{
.

Date: May 6,2008

Chairperson

F*

, .-LA-+&
j
F
f
l
I__///*
*
Frd5ces I:. Carr, Ph: 3 3 - - - - JL

-

--

L

Vice President for Research
and Dean of Graduate Studies

ABSTRACT
As the record industry’s fortunes decline, consumers experience increasing
access to the world’s recorded music, legally and otherwise, through digital
technologies. At the same time, recordings not only take up less physical space (on hard
drives and MP3 players), they are compressed — not just as data, but in terms of
dynamic range. While it allows for constant audibility in noisy environments like cars
and offices, dynamic range compression has frustrated many listeners for limiting the
impact of the music and causing “ear fatigue.”
These listeners long for access to the purity of the original recording before it
was “squashed,” but the problem is that the original recording does not, in a sense,
exist. Producers and mastering engineers assemble the tracks recorded and create a
particular sonic product that can later be revisited and “remastered.” Ostensibly this
process is meant to get closer to the original sound, but in reality it simply comprises a
different manner of interpreting the existing recording.
Theodor Adorno had written of surprisingly similar phenomena more than half a
century ago in essays like “The Radio Symphony” and the notes collected in Towards a
Theory of Musical Reproduction. Though infamous for his hostility toward popular
music and its “infantile” listeners, Adorno’s writings on music contain much that is
valuable for an understanding of how pop works in the digital age. Combined with a
consideration of works on music and postmodernity by Fredric Jameson, Jacques Attali,
François Lyotard and others, Adorno’s work helps one to consider how reification
continues to work in an era where music is seemingly no longer a “thing.”
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INTRODUCTION: POSTMODERNITY AND THE DIGITAL AGE
Moderninity: what it means to you and I and this CD you hold in your hand.
—Mark E. Smith, “The CD in Your Hand,” The Post Nearly Man (1998)
To speak of a digital age is to suggest two things: one, that this age is somehow
fundamentally different from some previous (presumably analogue) era; two, that the
difference is “determined” by technology. But as Jonathan Sterne reminds us, there are
reasons to be skeptical of this line of thinking.
Scholars often write about new digital communication technologies as if their
mere presence demands that social life and social thought be remade. But this is
advertising talk masquerading as academic discourse. If there is some social
magic in the digital transmission and storage of sound, it is not to be found in the
brute fact of the technology itself. Instead, we would have to ask the same
questions of CD, DVD or MP3 players, hard-disk recorders, wireless telephones,
and digital audio workstations that we asked of the telephone, the phonograph,
and the radio. Why these technologies, now? (337).
Sterne couches his argument in light of a criticism of periodization in general,
particularly insofar as it deems contemporary culture utterly divorced from its past. As an
example, Sterne mentions the oft-questioned distinction between modernity and
postmodernity: “Marx and Engels famously wrote of modernity in 1848, ‘All that is solid
melts into air.’ Jean-François Lyotard would echo their sentiments in 1979 as proof of a
postmodern condition” (335). The problem with this kind of epoch-making for Sterne is
that the “conditions” of modernity and postmodernity somehow precede human
endeavor, totalizing before the fact. Actually, he implicitly argues, notions of modernity
and postmodernity are very much the product of human foibles. And so it is with digital
technologies.

1

In part, I have chosen to write about “the digital age” simply as a shorthand for
the present era insofar as it is informed by the use of these technologies. I began this
project by attempting to ask what becomes of the “value” of popular music at a time
when it seemingly becomes free — even though, legally speaking, this is still not entirely
the case. While I do not exactly answer this question in these pages, I do find that one
way of explaining the record industry’s decline is to suggest that it is losing control of the
“original text” of popular music. Essentially, while the industry has maintained mastery
of the recordings it distributes with relative success for the better part of a century,
consumers now are “buying it” less and less. The record labels (or sometimes the artists)
do have something that the consumer does not, this being the master recordings from
which CDs, MP3s and other media are made. But no CD or other format is a perfect
reproduction of these recordings because specific decisions are made in the mastering
process about how the sound will be manipulated (even if the artist or engineer strives for
“transparency”). What’s more, multitrack recording, with its endless possibilities for
cutting and pasting, means that in a sense there is no “original recording” to refer to; the
“master” made from the multitracks can always be replaced by another. In the digital age,
this has become particularly evident with the rise of the “loudness wars,” in which
dynamic range compression is used to raise the overall volume of a recording while
reducing the difference between quiet and loud parts.
It would seem that the most obvious theorist with which to make these
arguments would be Walter Benjamin, whose “The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction” articulated the resistant possibilities of artworks that were all
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copies without an original. However, the rise of different available versions of a work
complicates this notion, particularly in the use of digital remastering, bringing consumers
to compare the sonic qualities of, say, the “original vinyl” to the CD reissue (or the
second, third or fourth CD reissue, to consider David Bowie or Elvis Costello). Because
it reflects a keen interest in issues of musical interpretation and reproduction, Theodor
Adorno’s work is more appropriate to the arguments I present. While I do not share
Adorno’s disdain for popular music, I find an that an engagement with his admittedly
thorny and “contradictory” texts can be productive for situating recorded music in the
present era.
To the extent that using Adorno is problematic — and there would be no reason
to “use” him if he was not — it is perhaps because of the tensions between modernism
and postmodernism. As perhaps the most famous (and most Marxism-informed) exegesis
of postmodernism, Fredric Jameson’s work helps to recontextualize Adorno’s. This is
particularly important when discussing problems of cultural “resistance” to capitalist
norms after the time of Schoenberg and Picasso. On this score I am, like Jameson,
basically ambivalent; the music I valorize in these pages is for the most part
commercially successful, and much of it does not challenge the political status quo in any
meaningful way. Yet since dynamic range compression has become an aesthetic status
quo, I argue that recordings that lack it have more depth and provide a more meaningful
“experience.” Two of the works I discuss at length, Kraftwerk’s “Autobahn” and the
Avalanches’ Since I Left You, aurally depict journeys; they provide an “escape” that is all
the more genuine for its lack of authenticity (“Autobahn”’s motorway sound effects are
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overtly synthetic; Since I Left You’s samples are altered in myriad ways). Adorno and
Horkheimer said that in the culture industry “Something is provided for all so that none
may escape” (1225); the only response one can offer in postmodernity may be that the
best escape is that which knows it isn’t one.
And yet if the original text of the recording is escaping the culture industry,
some sort of liberation does seem possible. Ironically, by introducing digital recordings to
the public as CDs, the industry ultimately enabled the online distribution of music as
MP3s, FLACs and other formats. Although for much of the nineties the CD was a major
boon for the industry, particularly as consumers replaced their vinyl albums with the new
format, it ultimately precipitated the industry’s current malaise and presumed future
downfall.
In a parallel paradox, Jameson’s depiction of late capitalism seems to hold out the
possibility of its decline. In Postmodernism, or the Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism
(1991), Jameson provides an account of the labyrinthine space of the Bonaventure Hotel
in Los Angeles. It “aspires to being a total space, a complete world, a kind of miniature
city” (40); its “glass skin repels the city outside . . . [like] those reflector sunglasses
which make it impossible for your interlocutor to see your own eyes and thereby achieve
a certain aggressivity and power toward the other” (42). Its “escalators and elevators”
have “their very real pleasures,” but taken as a whole they are “a transportation machine
which becomes the allegorical signifier of that older promenade we are no longer allowed
to conduct on our own” (42). Such is “the vengeance this space takes on those who still
seek to walk through it” that guests are unable to find their way: “Given the absolute
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symmetry of the four towers, it is quite impossible to get your bearings in this lobby”
(43). And so the result of this very mastery is that the shops within do poor business:
[I]t has been obvious since the very opening of the hotel in 1977 that nobody
could ever find any of these stores, and even if you located the appropriate
boutique, you would be most unlikely to be as fortunate a second time; as a
consequence, the commercial tenants are in despair and all the merchandise is
marked down to bargain prices. When you recall that Portman is a businessman as
well as an architect, and a millionaire developer, an artist who is at one and the
same time a capitalist in his own right, you cannot but feel that here too
something of a “return of the repressed” is involved (44).
The turmoil in the hotel’s retail sector is reminiscent of the record industry’s
decline in that the very way musical space was mapped — as a digital medium, on a
compact disc — ultimately brought about its decline. This despite the mastery the disc
seemed to represent: also having a glass sheen, with the “eyes” of the disc (the pits, the
zeroes and ones) invisible to the outside observer; a space that a consumer could map to
some extent by using the skip button (like an elevator’s floor buttons) but could not
“walk” through (i.e. watch the progress of the needle on the record, move the tone arm
physically). Both hotel and disc are antiseptic worlds, seemingly perfect unto themselves,
but both precipitate economic problems.
That the digital age be understood as a consequence of developments articulated
under the rubric of postmodernity should come as no surprise. Lyotard had spoken of the
computerization of society as a facet of the era in The Postmodern Condition, even in
1979 noting that his predictions were “banal” (7). This is part of what Sterne objects to
when critiquing the millenarian provocations of cultural theorists in The Audible Past. He
has a faith in a rearticulated humanism, in the continued value of human communication:
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To deprive the speaking subject of its presumptive privilege is not necessarily to
signal the death of the Enlightenment subject or the humanist subject as such. It is
to suggest, instead, a more thoroughgoing humanism, a more sophisticated
enlightenment, one that can move beyond the idealized voice of the one — a godlike voice in a human guise. Communication is a collective endeavor, not
reducible to a model of two people talking (343).
So when Jameson speaks of a “suppression of depth” in postmodernity (43) or Lyotard
argues that “Technology is . . . a game pertaining not to the true, the just, or the beautiful,
etc., but to efficiency” (44), Sterne would be suspicious.
Although Adorno would probably have approved of Lyotard and Jameson’s
assertions, one senses he may actually have shared some of Sterne’s antipathy towards
overhasty periodizing. While practically all of Adorno’s arguments require a sense of
history in order to function — consider, for instance, his famous remark about the
barbarity of writing poetry after Auschwitz (“Cultural Criticism” 34) — he tends not to
define historical eras with great specificity; the question of when the culture industry
“began,” for instance, is not addressed in Dialectic of Enlightenment.
In a letter to Walter Benjamin, Adorno criticized the latter’s poetic notion that
“Every epoch dreams its successor,” proclaiming it “undialectical . . . . For the sentence
implies three things: a conception of the dialectical image as a content of consciousness,
albeit a collective one; its direct — I would almost say: developmental — relatedness to
the future as Utopia; and a notion of the ‘epoch’ as proper, and self-contained subject of
this content of consciousness” (Aesthetics and Politics 111). On the most basic level, an
epoch isn’t a reality — neither objectively nor intersubjectively; the choice to fashion one
can lead to the construction of easy narratives where things happen as a matter of course.
While Adorno is certainly invested in describing social processes, he hopes that by
6

realizing how inscribed one is in these processes one can, paradoxically, put oneself
outside them.
This thesis attempts a similar movement. Chapter One considers Adorno’s
critique of “infantile” music listening and approaches the problem of text and
interpretation of recorded music in this light. To believe that one is experiencing the
music “itself” in some objective fashion is childish, and yet there is perhaps no other way
to experience music. In postmodernity, there is no way beyond childhood (or rather, the
distinction between childhood and adulthood is essentially vexed). So while this chapter
is concerned with entrapment, Chapter Two seeks possibilities of musical escape in the
digital age. How does one experience music authentically while knowing that the
experience is always mediated, always “false”? Here the tension between expansion and
compression is considered in light of the “ambient” experience of music (both as ambient
music and as pop made ambient by Muzak) before focusing on readings of Since I Left
You and Roìsin Murphy’s song and video “Overpowered.” Inevitably, the two chapters
address some of the same topics — dynamic range compression, postmodernity, the
possibility of resistance; my hope is that these repetitions will not prove too “distracting”
but rather reinforce the larger dialectical rhythm.
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CHAPTER ONE: IS THERE ANY WAY BEYOND “INFANTILE” LISTENING?
ADORNO, MUSICAL INTERPRETATION AND THE ELUSIVE ORIGINAL

Popular music scholarship as a whole cannot help but approach Theodor
Adorno’s work without a fundamental ambivalence. On the one hand, Adorno and his
colleagues in the Frankfurt school helped to legitimize the study of popular culture in the
academy. On the other, Adorno in particular treated popular culture with derision,
suggesting that it was a top-down mechanism through which consumers were controlled,
a “culture industry.” Repeatedly noting the “infantile” character of hit parade fans,
Adorno seldom if ever allowed that pop music might also have a potential for resistance,
or that consumers might have meaningful agency. Frustratingly, he never addressed the
sweeping changes in popular music (jazz especially) that occurred in the twenty years
prior to his death in 1969. Yet in a way his writings provided the occasion for one of the
most frequent cultural studies arguments: responding to Adorno, cultural critics have
concluded that most “popular” commodities are irredeemable, but certain ones “resist”
normative capitalist culture in some way.
I am using Adorno’s work to pursue a somewhat different line of argument. I am
concerned first and foremost with how we get at “the text” of popular music, or the music
“itself.” For Adorno, this was more of a problem for classical music than for pop, yet
some of his writings about classical music and its interpretation and mediation provide a
useful point of departure for thinking about similar aesthetic issues in pop. What emerges
is that just as there is no definitive interpretation of a classical work, there is really no
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way to hear the work itself in pop, either, despite the notion that all copies of a recording
are the same.
Because Adorno regarded pop music fans as “childish” – whether through their
own fault or that of the culture industry – the issue of whether the “work” itself could be
“truly heard” would probably have been irrelevant to him: it contained no truth to begin
with. In the age of modernism, in fact, even the great classical works of an earlier age
could no longer stand true because of their commodification. “A successful work,” he
wrote in his 1951 essay “Cultural Criticism and Society,” “is not one which resolves
objective contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one which expresses the idea of
harmony negatively by embodying the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its
innermost structure” (32). Thus his oft-noted enthusiasm for modernist composers like
Arnold Schoenberg, whose twelve-tone music strikes many listeners as impenetrable
even today, even after achieving the canonicity Adorno disdained (once twelve-tone
became a kind of recipe, it lost its critical edge, as Adorno would point out in “The Aging
of the New Music”). Music that would lay some claim to oppositionality can only do so
by engaging the listener on an intellectual level, by making one recognize that
conventional harmony is a delusion.
This critique can seem deeply perverse. After all, it is tempting to hear music
opening up possibilities of resistance, escape and meaning in a world where mundanity
dominates, to hope that it is not just more of the same, that it provides access to some
kind of authentic experience. Music, one might argue, should redeem the world, not
negate it. But Adorno will have none of this.
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By way of illustration, one might consider Oliver Sacks’ account of the life of
Clive Wearing. Wearing, a British musician and musicologist, suffered a brain infection
in his forties that caused severe amnesia. He had a memory span of “only a few seconds”
and had forgotten “virtually his entire past” (188). In an attempt to retrieve some
semblance of greater continuity in his life, Clive tried keeping a journal, but all his entries
tended to read the same: “I am conscious,” “I am awake” or “this time properly awake.”
He would describe his experience as follows: “I haven’t heard anything, seen anything,
touched anything, smelled anything. . . . It’s like being dead” (189); “I am completely
incapable of thinking” (190).
Despite these major shortcomings, however, Clive remained a very
accomplished musician. Though when asked to name the composers he knew he could
only come up with four, Sacks recalls that he had no trouble playing through one of
Bach’s Forty-Eight Preludes and Fugues: “He remembers almost nothing unless he is
actually doing it; then it may come to him. He inserted a tiny, charming improvisation at
one point, and did a sort of Chico Marx ending, with a huge downward scale. With his
great musicality and his playfulness, he can easily improvise, joke, play with any piece of
music” (198). Sacks describes how Clive performs in a 1986 BBC documentary, Prisoner
of Consciousness:
In these scenes from only a year or so after his illness, his face often appeared
tight with torment and bewilderment. But when he was conducting his old choir,
he did this with great sensitivity and grace, mouthing the melodies, turning to
different singers and sections of the choir, cuing them, encouraging them, to bring
out their special parts. It is obvious that Clive not only knew the piece perfectly,
how all the parts contributed to the unfolding of the musical thought, but also
retained all the special skills of conducting, his professional persona, and his own
unique style (204-205).
10

Music provides a structure and continuity that allows Clive to engage with the world, and
with other human beings, that ordinary conversation and day-to-day existence do not. On
the one hand, this seems miraculous. On the other, it is universal (at least for music
lovers): music can put one in the moment, change and channel emotions, and provide
reassurance, comfort and a sense of authority at times when these are lacking. No
particular piece of music will do this for all people in any given context, and some
individuals are indifferent to music (Freud and Nabokov being famous examples), but
certainly much of the power of music has been to make one “feel good,” or at least feel
something. On this level, while one might find that Clive is redeemed by his ability to
engage in an intellectual process, the resonance of his story lies in its pathos.
Yet for Adorno, Clive would be more conscious when he is “dead,” when his
experience is discontinuous and he is aware of his alienation (even if he does not
understand his amnesia as such). When Clive leads the chorus, he is engaging in a
“spurious harmony” that cannot ultimately reconcile the real dissonance of his existence.
In an Adornian reading, this is what makes Clive’s experience “universal”: that the
meaning or catharsis provided by most musical experience in modernity is false, and that
it is only through difficult, serious intellectual engagement – specifically in the form of
negative dialectics – that we can hope to find some semblance, or at least some
possibility of real freedom.
Popular music, at least as conventionally understood – three-to-four-minute songs
with a verse/chorus/bridge structure, typically in 4/4 time, with easily recalled melodies,
rhythms and “hooks” – seems unlikely to force the kind of thinking Adorno requires. One
11

can, as Adorno did in various essays (most infamously those on jazz), bring negative
dialectics to bear on pop songs, but the songs themselves, if dialectical at all (say,
between the verse and the bridge) tend to find a synthesis (in the chorus).
It is these qualities that brought Adorno to regard pop songs and their audience as
childish. In his 1938 essay “On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of
Listening,” he wrote, “Regressive listeners behave like children. Again and again and
with stubborn malice, they demand the one dish they have once been served” (Essays on
Music 307). But this behavior was hardly limited to popular music audiences; it
infiltrated the reception of classical works as well. Given the circumstances of atomistic
listening and fetishizing interpretations of the latter, Adorno wanted to find a purer way
to get at the text. In a 1959 note for a projected work called Toward a Theory of Musical
Reproduction, he wrote:
Introduce the mere reading of music as a conceptual extreme. Perhaps — as a
residue of unsublimated mimesis — the ‘making’ of music is already no less
infantile than reading aloud (comes to the fore in choir). Silent reading as the
legacy and conclusion of interpretation. It is this possibility — playing complex
chamber music from memory . . . and as asserting the absolute primacy of the text
over its imitation — in comparison to which essentially all ‘music-making’
already sounds antiquated (Toward a Theory 5).
So Clive, whatever he conducts, is finally still engaged in something infantile. And Sacks
would not necessarily deny it: although he expresses incredulity that an “artistic or
creative performance of this caliber [could] be adequately explained by ‘procedural
memory,’” he nonetheless explains that
Episodic or explicit memory, we know, develops relatively late in childhood and
is dependent on a complex brain system involving the hippocampi and temporal
lobe structures, the system that is compromised in severe amnesiacs and all but
obliterated in Clive. The basis of procedural or implicit memory is less easy to
12

define, but it certainly involves larger and more primitive parts of the brain –
subcortical structures like the basal ganglia and cerebellum and their many
connections to each other and to the cerebral cortex (207).
So in a way, Adorno is right: although Clive presumably learned his musical skills over
years of study, the cerebral structures that allowed him to do so are actually those that
mature first; therefore, music making in general is infantile. Perversely, Adorno suggests
that reading music would be truer to the music than listening to it, even though he knows
that a written score is not music itself but an interpretation of imagined music. The
spuriousness of the harmony is not just in the literal presence of harmony but in the
received wisdom. We will recall that for Sacks, “Clive not only knew the piece perfectly,
how all the parts contributed to the unfolding of the musical thought, but also retained . . .
his own unique style.” That “the musical thought” would “unfold” in such a natural way
indicates that this “prisoner of consciousness” has escaped consciousness, replacing it
with style.
If this reading of Clive’s brief triumph over adversity sounds cruel, even antihumanistic, Adorno would certainly have recognized the perversity; “introducing
conceptual extremes” is an essential component of his negative dialectics. The fact that
he never completed Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction indicates, perhaps, that
he had not quite arrived at just how one should arrive at the “x-ray image” he thought
musical interpretation should produce (1). And yet this very unfinished quality resonates
with the lack of synthesis in his dialectical approach. In this way, no Adorno text can be
considered a “definitive” representation of his thought, and virtually any criticism of the
limitations of his arguments can be answered, at least partly, by the work itself.
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For instance, one might quite reasonably find Adorno’s take on the “infantile”
aspects of music performance and listening hostile, not just for what it says about music
but for what it says about childhood: surely one can find richness and gratification in the
memory of one’s youth. A properly Marxist perspective, of course, would not find much
use for nostalgia, but Adorno was hardly an orthodox Marxist: in a 1965 radio lecture
“On the Question: What Is German?” he recalls one of several reasons he wished to
return to Germany during his American sojourn: “I simply wanted to go back to the place
where I spent my childhood, where what is specifically mine was imparted to the very
core. Perhaps I sensed that whatever one accomplishes in life is little other than the
attempt to regain childhood” (126).
While Adorno’s childhood included access to the tradition of European art
music, most present-day Westerners are brought up hearing popular music. In this way,
while Adorno wishes to get at the real text, or the “true” interpretation of a classical work
that probably does not exist, pop music listeners may be engaged in a similar search.
What’s more, although some listeners do experience their tastes shifting and evolving
from pop to classical (and jazz, which by now arguably has a similar status), the “adult”
audience for rock and related styles has grown significantly since the fifties – a trend that
could reflect either more sophisticated pop music, a more prolonged adolescence (as
Adorno would have thought) or some combination of these features. It may simply be
that the shrinking distinction between “high” and “low” culture that Fredric Jameson and
others observed as a feature of postmodernity dovetails with an increasingly uncertain
distinction between adulthood and adolescence.
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Adorno, hoping what he learned from his exile experience would enable him to
combat “the fabrication of stereotypes” (“On the Question” 125) nonetheless
acknowledged that “The identification with the familiar is an undeniable aspect of this
hope although it must not be misused as a theoretical justification for an impulse which is
probably legitimate only as long as it is obeyed without appealing to involved theoretical
justifications” (126). One might extrapolate something about music here: that although
pop music audiences identify with the familiar, this does not necessarily have to indicate
that they are, in essence, infantile. Choosing to listen to and enjoy pop music is, perhaps,
not theoretically justified; at the worst level, one might (to use a phrase Adorno often
employed) find it has value because of its “mere existence,” but on the other hand, to the
extent that it forms part of our identity and consciousness, it is certainly worth theorizing
about.
But just as one can never fully regain childhood, one can also never “objectively”
locate the music. Fredric Jameson described this problem in “Reification and Utopia”:
In mass culture, repetition effectively volatilizes the original object – the “text,”
the “work of art” – so that the student of mass culture has no primary object of
study.
The most striking demonstration of this process can be witnessed in our
reception of contemporary pop music of whatever type . . . . [W]e never hear any
of the singles produced in these genres “for the first time”; instead, we live a
constant exposure to them in all kinds of different situations, from the steady beat
of the car radio through the sounds at lunch, or in the work place, or in shopping
centers, all the way to those apparently full-dress performances of the “work” in a
nightclub or stadium concert or on the records you buy and take home to hear.
This is a very different situation from the first bewildered audition of a
complicated classical piece, which you hear again in the concert hall or listen to at
home. The passionate attachment one can form to this or that pop single, the rich
personal investment of all kinds of private associations and existential symbolism
which is the feature of such attachment, are fully as much a function of our own
familiarity as of the work itself: the pop single, by means of repetition, insensibly
15

becomes part of the existential fabric of our own lives, so that what we listen to is
ourselves, our own previous auditions (137-138).
The distinction Jameson draws between pop and classical, while allowing more for the
meaningful potential of popular music, is not in essence far removed from Adorno’s view
of pop as essentially a commodity. Certainly classical was commodified too, but pop
existed only for and by the market, with songs distinguished only by pseudo individual
elements (the eccentricities of a particular jazz soloist, say, or the texture of a singer’s
voice) — an emphasis on the detail over the whole, as the wholes of pop songs were
(according to Adorno) always the same: “No longer do the partial moments serve as a
critique of the whole; instead, they suspend the critique which the successful aesthetic
totality exerts against the flawed one of society” (“Fetish Character” 291).
Consequently the question of taste in popular music is a false one:
If one seeks to find out who “likes” a commercial piece, one cannot avoid the
suspicion that liking and disliking are inappropriate to the situation, even if the
person questioned clothes his reactions in those words. The familiarity of the
piece is a surrogate for the quality ascribed to it. To like it is almost the same
thing as to recognize it. An approach in terms of value judgments has become a
fiction for the person who finds himself hemmed in by standardized musical
goods. He can neither escape impotence nor decide between the offerings where
everything is so completely identical that preference in fact depends merely on
biographical details or on the situation in which things are heard (288).
Jameson, in “Reification and Utopia,” had posited that the problem with Adorno’s culture
industry critique was that its valorization of high art as “resistant” belonged to a specific
historical moment, that of modernism; he points out that such respected writers as
Dickens and Balzac had mass audiences in their day (134). Nonetheless, his
understanding of what constitutes the “text” of popular music is very similar to Adorno’s,
and like Adorno he makes the divide between classical works (as something one does,
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indeed, hear for the first time) and popular music a real, meaningful one. In his various
writings, Jameson is far more likely to analyze a film or building in detail than a pop
song, preferring instead to describe general qualities of “postmodern” bands. The threat
of autobiography — not the kind that emerges, finally, as a critique of larger
socioeconomic structures but that which says “they’re playing our song” — abounds.
Even Simon Frith, who has been concerned with the problem of pop music’s value for
decades, finds himself unable to answer Adorno directly: he argues that “The utopian
impulse, the negation of everyday life, the aesthetic impulse that Adorno recognized in
high art, must be part of low art too,” but in saying this he acknowledges that “my own
tastes will inform everything that follows” (20). Can it be otherwise? The presence of so
many “introductory” academic texts on pop music relative to more focused studies
suggests an inability to get beyond a basic acquaintance, as with any object of desire
whose true character eludes when one is blinded by lust or stereotype.
In Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock, Theodor Gracyk makes an attempt
to remedy this problem by defining the “work” in popular music. Along the way, he
offers numerous criticisms of Adorno, some of them less persuasive than others,1 but
some of which can actually engage Adorno in productive ways. Popular music’s
“commodity character,” he argues,

1

Gracyk argues, for instance, that “If Adorno is concerned that the mass audience
vulgarizes great music with a fetishization of its parts at the expense of the larger whole,
his own fetishism likes in focusing on structure at the expense of other musical values”
(165). Although Adorno certainly valued structural listening, he was not averse to
excerpts and in 1965 even put together a two-hour radio program called “Beautiful
Passages” which consisted of fifty-two brief moments from classical compositions with
his commentary (Leppert 227).
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does not exhaust its appeal. Reviving the primacy of music as something heard,
both jazz and rock reject the tyranny of the composer’s intentions and the
autonomous musical composition as the focus of listening. Emphasizing
individuality and individual performance, jazz negates conventions developed by
the tradition of Bach to Schoenberg. Offering recordings as primary texts, rock
emphasizes a multileveled collaboration and negates the same conventions. At the
same time, Adorno’s insistence that nonmusical factors must be considered in
interpreting and evaluating musical works reminds us that music’s core properties
are always culturally emergent. Rather than explain its appeal, the “culture
industry” may generate barriers to hearing rock and jazz, just as Adorno thinks it
has for serious music (173).
Two of these points merit consideration. The first is Gracyk’s insistence that the
recording in rock is the primary text, rather than a composition or a particular
performance. He notes that even “live” recordings are not typically reproductions of an
original event (the way they are mixed combines perspectives that could not coexist at
once). Pop and rock music is sometimes composed in the studio, often without the use of
sheet music, and live performances are typically judged by comparison to recordings.
That multitrack recording makes possible “performances” that could not take place in a
live setting has been a commonplace for decades; in fact, now that computers and
elaborate digital synthesizers have prominent roles in live performances, this is in a sense
no longer true (although the “liveness” of the performance might appear compromised).
But the second point I wish to examine — that, in fact, the culture industry
obstructs proper listening to rock music as well as classical — actually complicates the
first. The use of dynamic range compression in contemporary mastering alters recordings
in substantial ways, and thus the problems of interpretation Adorno explored in Towards
a Theory of Musical Reproduction actually have some significance for recordings. By
bringing recordings to a relatively constant volume, dynamic range compression alters
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their meaning or potential meaning, and remastering is an reinterpretation (based on what
audiences “want” to hear) that makes the music harder to listen to.
First, though, I should note that Gracyk has, to some extent, anticipated these
issues. He discusses the problem of multiple available versions of a recording and asks
whether their differing sonic characters make them different “works.” He mentions, for
instance, Neil Young’s infamous disgruntlement with digital technology: “Listening to a
CD is like looking through a screen window. . . . It’s an insult to the brain and the heart
and feelings to have to listen to this and think it’s music” (22). Gracyk ultimately
maintains, though, that while an album might have been recorded to be heard via
analogue media (a vinyl record, a transistor radio), digital remastering does not create a
fraudulent variation, even where remixing is involved, unless the remix is designated a
“special version.” “While they are audibly different from the originals, audible
differences are insufficient to make them distinct works. It seems that both genealogy and
intention are required to distinguish one work from another when we are dealing with
nonperforming arts that have multiple genuine instantiations” (28-29). Thus Gracyk’s
view of the infinite reproducibility of recordings, while acknowledging that differences
exist, is essentially faithful to the Benjaminian notion of the work of art that has no
“aura,” no original.
Nonetheless, in the packaging of reissues of back catalogue titles, record labels
will often advertise that the disc has been “remastered from the original master tapes,”
implying that while any given copy a consumer purchases of this reissue will be identical
to another, what makes its value greater from that of previous releases is that it is closer
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to the source material (first generation CD reissues often being mastered from whatever
source material was most immediately accessible – often not a “first generation” source).
In the past few years many reissues have reproduced the cover of the box housing the
master tape, with handwritten track listing and times. That the master tape itself is a kind
of inaccessible fetish object — albeit one that most consumers would be unable to play
anyway — is suggested by the series of Abba reissues from 2001: an insert depicts the
covers of each album with the catalog numbers beneath, but in the center is a photo of the
boxed master tapes captioned “not for sale.” And no wonder: they were remastered yet
again in 2005. As long as Universal Music Group has financial incentive to keep
revisiting the Abba catalogue, they need to appeal to the notion that each time they are
getting closer and closer to the original, bringing out further unheard details. The master
tapes signal the authenticity of the product, but they also hold out a talismanic sense of
infinite possibility (even as new technologies like SACD supposedly have sampling rates
and frequency ranges that far exceed the range of human hearing and could presumably
reproduce every nuance of tape hiss).
The irony is that the remastering of Abba’s catalogue has, with respect to dynamic
range, probably gotten further from the master tapes with each new release. (At the time
of this writing, Wikipedia’s page on “the loudness wars” compares waveforms of “One of
Us” from 1981’s The Visitors in its 1983 and 2005 CD reissues, with the latter of course
filling up a considerably greater share of the available space.) In fact, most rock and pop
remastering jobs follow the “squashing” trends of newer recordings. Human hearing
naturally responds to louder sound as “better,” at least in the short term, so it is not
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surprising that recording engineers — often against their inclinations, or so the story
goes — have been asked to produce ever louder-sounding masters. Mastering engineer
Bernie Grundman says, “I can’t tell you how many times someone comes in and plays me
something he wants mastered and I'll say, ‘Do you want to make it slamming loud or
retain some of this great sound?’ They'll say, ‘We want to keep it really pristine.’ Then
the next day they'll call me and say, ‘How come mine isn't as loud as so and so's?’” (qtd.
in Levine).
One might ask why this would be cause for complaint: after all, top 40 radio has
compressed the range of the singles it plays in order to produce constant volume for
many years; pop music typically lacks the kinds of shifts in volume one finds in much
orchestral music from the Romantic period onward (a compressed Bolero would make no
sense at all). If rock and pop music are mainly meant to sell themselves, they need to get
your attention, and thus it makes sense that they be loud. However, if everything is more
or less equally loud, nothing will stand out, and thus it has become increasingly common
for listeners to complain about “ear fatigue.” There is even some speculation that the
loudness wars are responsible for declining compact disc sales, although it would be hard
to prove this empirically, since some very loud CDs have sold very well (the success of
Oasis’ What’s the Story Morning Glory?, a very loud recording at the time of its 1995
release, is said to have precipitated the loudness wars). If, as Gracyk argues, rock is a
recording art, it is reasonable to suggest that more subtly mastered recordings with
greater amounts of detail and range are, in some sense, better. In particular, the sense of
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“space” one can hear in a recording has value to the extent that it creates an immersive
sound world.
Adorno himself valued these qualities, if not insofar as they applied to popular
music. In “The Radio Symphony” (1941), he writes, “To ‘enter’ a symphony means to
listen to it not only as to something before one, but as something around one as well, as a
medium in which one ‘lives.’ It is this surrounding quality that comes closest to the idea
of symphonic absorption” (257). Thus the specifically monaural quality of radio limits
the music, but this is not all. For Adorno, if Beethoven’s music is properly rendered, it
can make the listener lose awareness of its duration — but not as it is heard over the
radio.
The first bars of the Fifth Symphony, if rightly performed, must possess the
characteristic of a “statement,” of a “positing.” The positing characteristic,
however, can be achieved only by the utmost dynamic intensity. Hence, the
question of loudness ceases to be a purely external one and affects the very
structure of [the] symphony. Presented without the dynamic emphasis which
makes out of the Nothing of the first bars virtually the Everything of the total
movement, the idea of the work is missed before it has been actually started. The
suspension of time-consciousness is endangered from the very beginning: the
simple, no longer emphasized in its paradoxical nature as Nothing and
Everything, threatens to degenerate into the trite of the “nothingness” of the
beginning fails to be absorbed into the whole by the impetus of the statement. The
tension is broken and the whole movement is on the verge of relapsing into time
(259).
From a compositional point of view — at least the kind of composition Adorno is
referring to — popular music doesn’t have the same kind of subtlety and existential
impact that a Beethoven symphony does. But the issues of space and duration do matter
in popular music to the extent that a lack of dynamics makes it difficult for listeners to
sustain attention: “The excitement in music comes from variation in rhythm, timbre, pitch
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and loudness,” says Daniel Levitin. “If you hold one of those constant, it can seem
monotonous” (qtd. in Levine). Monotony puts the listener pretty squarely back in time
consciousness.
Since the traditional pop song is three or four minutes long, one might ask how a
change in dynamic range is really going to change the fundamental monotony, the
repetition of the structure. For Adorno, indeed it might not. Nonetheless, one can cite
numerous examples of popular music whose impact is largely driven by dynamics. For
instance, much of the “alternative” music of the late eighties and early nineties would
actually repeat the same riff for the duration of the song; choruses were distinguished by
an increase in volume as much as anything else (Nirvana’s “Smells Like Teen Spirit” is
characteristic).
That said, popular music had expanded its boundaries considerably in the sixties
and seventies. The seventies were probably the peak decade of the album as art form,
with songs expanding into side-long suites and concept albums coming right and left.
This is an appropriate figure of speech for a time when stereo became established as the
dominant listening mode for LPs, something that brought Adorno some satisfaction, to
judge from “Opera and the Long-Playing Record.”
One of the most famous side-long recordings of the seventies, the title track to
Kraftwerk’s Autobahn (1974), hailed from Adorno’s homeland. It makes an interesting
comparison with Adorno’s account of Beethoven’s Fifth: if the latter achieved its
meaning through the tension between the “Nothing” of the opening and the “Everything”
of the whole first movement, “Autobahn” is in a sense all Nothing — or rather it’s
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impossible to say if it’s Nothing or Everything, as there is very little tension. It maintains
the same pace throughout, and for the most part repeats the same refrain: “Wir fahren
fahren fahren auf der Autobahn.” The mindlessness of this repetition might well have
grated on Adorno, who quite naturally saw the autobahn as part of the infrastructure of
the Third Reich, a sign of the end of modernist German culture (Minima Moralia 57). We
drive on the highway, we participate in the infrastructure: we do as we should. And while
the distorted, highly chorused voices that intone “AU… TO… BAHN” about a minute in
hint at some kind of threat, the track essentially drifts along gracefully like a wellmaintained vehicle on smooth pavement.
And yet “Autobahn” is not boring. Synthesized sounds fade in and out like
different forms of vegetation, the volume subtly surges and declines as though passing
over long hills. Key changes suggest new enticements — a certain amount of distance
covered, a city passed by; nothing fundamentally changes, but there is a quiet satisfaction
in being served by machines, and perhaps being one with them. (Perhaps this fantasy of
unimpeded comfort and convenience was particularly appealing in light of the 1973 oil
shortage; an abridged version of “Autobahn” made the U.S. top forty.) The pleasures of
the recording might appear infantile, like a child’s fascination with light switches, power
buttons and other enticing modes of transformation; it may be that the ideal listener is the
child in the passenger seat. Nonetheless, this fascination with gadgetry never goes away
for many adults.
The 1986 UK CD release of Autobahn never reaches peak volume; its waveform
has a great deal of what audiophiles call “headroom.” To date, long-promised remasters
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of Kraftwerk’s catalog have yet to appear, but if they followed contemporary mastering
trends, one can only guess that much of what makes the recording effective — what
makes it an “accurate” depiction of the autobahn — would be dismantled. Dynamic range
compression not only makes everything loud (and surely a smartly engineered vehicle
should run quiet!), it “squashes” the sounds together so that they lack individual presence
(which makes it difficult to hear if something is wrong with the car).
For all that, though, there is nothing in the original multitracks that says the
recording has to be mastered a certain way. (Kraftwerk remixed it and other tracks for
their 1990 release The Mix, after all.) If one does listen to Autobahn in the car, chances
are she will not hear the sound of the car starting on the disc beneath the sound of her
own, and much of what goes on in quieter passages will be inaudible as well (unless the
driver decides to turn up the volume so that the loud passages are quite loud indeed). So
in a way a dynamically compressed Autobahn would actually better suit the environment
it was meant to depict. Moreover, since what little tension existed would be removed, the
recording would be even more properly Nothing than before. It would also be a less
engaging listen.

“The ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] of the results of forward-moving technology
— which does not tolerate any constraint — confirms the ambiguity of the process of
forward-moving rationality as such,” Adorno wrote in his 1927 essay “The Curves of the
Needle” (271-2). Speaking anachronistically, he could have been discussing Kraftwerk’s
synthetic sounds and their employment in the service of transportation (they never sing
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“wir fahren nicht” or “wir halten”), or he might have been addressing the benefits and
detriments of the loudness wars. Instead, he was concerned with records which, now
reproducing electric rather than acoustic recordings, managed greater “plasticity and
volume” while losing “the subtlety of color and the authenticity of vocal sound” (271).
The essay is a collection of brief aphorisms revealing, not surprisingly, a basic
ambivalence toward the object. While noting at one point that newer records “wear out
faster” (271), he later suggests that “The archival character of records is readily apparent:
just in time, the shrinking sounds are provided with herbaria that endure for ends that are
admittedly unknown” (274). And while Adorno naturally points out the commodity fetish
aspect of the discs, which “are virtual photographs of their owners, flattering photographs
— ideologies” (274), he also observes their entropic possibilities: they “interfere with
both the work and the interpretation” when the spring wears out and “the sound drops in
chromatic weakness and the music bleakly plays itself out. Only when gramophonic
reproduction breaks down are its objects transformed” (275).
Adorno does not speculate on the dialectic between the record as archival
document and as a source of technological rupture. During his lifetime, records would be
used in the creation of musique concrete, but Adorno thought this genre had “failed to
fulfill its own idea” and that its compositions all essentially sounded the same – the
technology was more in charge than the composer (“Aging” 194-195). The obvious
contemporary parallel is hip-hop, which I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Two; for
now it seems relevant to note the use of turntables as against convention while also fitting
in the groove of the music: Adorno saw a glimmer of possibility in the gramophone that
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“breaks down,” but in hip-hop samples from records become “breaks”; malfunction
becomes function. This practice does “interfere with both the work and the
interpretation,” as when the Beastie Boys loop the guitar and drums from the Beatles’
“The End” in “The Sounds of Science” (from Paul’s Boutique, 1989). In the context of
Abbey Road (1969), “The End” both (almost) caps the record and the Beatles’ career with
triumphant affirmation; in “The Sounds of Science,” the “theft” is essentially irreverent,
as the Beastie Boys rap about drugs, women, dancing, partying and the evils of the
establishment with rhythmic authority and little sense (“No one really knows what I’m
talking about,” admits Adam Yauch). What’s more, the actual assembly of samples was
largely done by the Dust Brothers, making questions of originality and authorship
problematic at best. Obviously the Beastie Boys, who bragged of “Rhymin’ and Stealin’”
on Licensed to Ill (1986), know this and are gleeful about it.
And in its way Paul’s Boutique and other ‘80s hip-hop albums did present a
challenge to the culture industry in their free appropriation of source material; two years
later it would have been legally necessary to get sample clearances in order to release the
album, which would have been prohibitively expensive (and probably impossible in some
cases). One can proclaim ignorance (“No one really knows”), but in the end the “text” of
the recordings sampled is brought to bear on the defendants.2
Adorno explored the notion of the record as a literal text in “The Form of the
Phonograph Record” (1934), describing its grooves as “a delicately scribbled, utterly
2

Or at least it was at that time. Mashups and other forms of cutup smorgasbords are now
everywhere on the internet; it may be hard to profit from such productions, but it is not
difficult to get them out to an audience. The record industry can only sue so many of its
customers and purloiners.
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illegible writing” (277). Obviously this essay dates itself when it announces that there is
no “gramophone-specific music” – studio recording has changed this, so that virtually all
rock and pop recordings are made, if not for particular formats, at least for some kind of
playback reproduction. Moreover, the issue of the medium’s roughly three-minute time
limitation, which Adorno correctly notes favor “Dances composed of dull repetitions”
(278), has since been bypassed by a variety of media (MP3s can go on for hours if need
be). But the text remains illegible, even when converted to ones and zeroes, except by the
technology itself.
An objection might be raised that digital technology has in fact made accessible a
legible representation of music: the waveform. In order to analyze the digital audio from
“Autobahn,” all I need to do is import the data from the CD into a recording program like
Audacity or ProTools. If I wish to make embellishments, the process is not dissimilar to
what I do with a word processing document, selecting a portion of audio, cutting and
pasting it, changing the “font” with various functions that alter the sound’s frequencies,
texture, volume, and pitch.
For all that, no one “listens” to waveforms as such (although listeners interested in
the mastering may watch the waveform as the track plays, and recording artists and
engineers certainly do). Digital technology has not yet made music into pure writing, and
yet its cut-and-paste aesthetic may appear to come “at the price of its immediacy,” which
Adorno said would be the cost of turning music into writing. The hope, though, was that
turning music into writing would create “true language to the extent that it relinquishes its
being as mere signs” (279-280). But while waveforms “don’t lie,” they also don’t really
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convey much more than rhythm and tempo (which can be perceived by examining the
regularity of the peaks) and dynamics. Melody and harmony are elusive, which is perhaps
appropriate for musics whose most distinctive qualities tend to lie elsewhere.
Adorno’s last essay on records was “Opera and the Long-Playing Record” (1969).
Being written for the popular German weekly Der Spiegel, this piece is somewhat less
dialectically engaged than its predecessors and takes an unusually favorable view of
technology. Long playing stereo records, Adorno says, have overcome the sonic
boundaries of earlier Platten. “The entire musical literature could now become available
in quite-authentic form to listeners desirous of auditioning and studying [opera] at a time
convenient to them” (283). Adorno does have reservations: that LPs end the era of a
certain kind of hybrid of pop and classical (“the Neapolitan semihits whose image Proust
attached in an unforgettable manner to ‘O sole mio’”); they seem overpriced; worst of all,
“the manipulation of the sound” remains (Adorno does not specify on this point).
Nonetheless, what LPs do is provide for the archive that interests Adorno throughout his
writings on records: “Similar to the fate that Proust ascribed to paintings in museums,
these recordings awaken to a second life in the wondrous dialogue with the lonely and
perceptive listeners, hibernating for purposes unknown” (285-286). These listeners seek
refuge from the visual distractions of the opera house, where both period appropriate and
modern costuming are out of place (283). In this sense, as Richard Leppert notes,
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“Adorno re-imagines the progressive potential for what was, after all, an established
commodity form” (236).3
Yet Adorno’s claim for the authenticity of this commodity is troubling. While it
might be unfair to criticize Adorno for a popular piece written at a time when he was still
working on such demanding texts as Aesthetic Theory, the notion that the records more or
less represent the works adequately sidesteps issues of musical interpretation he had
written about extensively. To complain about “the manipulation of the sound” is to ignore
that sound is, in a sense, always manipulated (i.e., it does not occur “naturally”)
whenever the occasion is for recording, and even when it is not. As Jonathan Sterne
attests to in The Audible Past, early audio documentarians wanted to get the best “take”
of a “real-life” sonic phenomena (235).
By way of justifying the enjoyment of a commodity, Adorno argues that “there
remains hardly any means other than possession, other than reification, through which
one can get at anything unmediated in this world” (285). What is peculiar on the face of
this statement is that Adorno seems to imply that an LP is not a medium. In the
conventional sense, records are a medium through which to hear sound recordings. In
another sense, though, Adorno is right in that the recording is not a medium through
which to hear an original, whether it would be “the work itself” or “the recording itself.”
Manipulation is the essence of recording. The most profound and surprising benefit of
musical reification is that it does not, that it cannot, reproduce authenticity.
3

One wonders if Adorno simply finds visual stimuli a distraction from the music
regardless of their historical relevance. He is somewhat like those rock fans who felt that
MTV corrupted rock music in the eighties, making it more about image than substance.
In this sense it is difficult to see his critique of visual distractions as progressive.
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CHAPTER TWO: MUSIC RETURNS TO THE AIR: SPACE AND ESCAPE IN
THE DIGITAL AGE

In his philosophical look at records, The Recording Angel (1987), Evan Eisenberg
suggests that “music becomes a thing” in the twentieth century (9). Prior to the mass
production of records, people didn’t “own” music; even written scores were not for the
public at large. It was shellac and later vinyl discs that seemingly solidified music, before
these were supplanted by the compact disc. The latter technology, Eisenberg mused in a
1996 Afterword, seemed almost to threaten the thingness: “the CD’s iridescent sheen
hints that it is not really a thing at all, just a ring of bright air plucked from the nimbus of
music that envelopes the planet” (212). This seeming immateriality foretold a real one:
Ten years ago, I wrote that digital sound would return music to the Pythagorean
realm of pure number. For most people, though, number has nothing to do with it.
People don’t read the numbers of the waveform samples on their compact discs,
any more than they read the bits on their floppy discs. Instead, music — like
everything else — has become “information.” Of this, the elevated view —
Teilhardian, if not quite Pythagorean — is that music is poised to enter the
noosphere, Earth’s whirring halo of mind. Freed from the spell of thinghood,
music takes wing once again, carrying everything else on its back. In the digital
age, the question of who actually owns and houses the Elgin Marbles ceases to
matter; they are shattered to bits, the dematerialized image free for the taking. Not
only all arts but all things aspire to the condition of music (213).
Eisenberg anticipates the liberating possibilities of music’s digitization: no longer trapped
on records, music channels through our collective brains. While physical products are
still needed to achieve this channeling, they take up so little space that it almost seems we
need not notice them. Moreover, recordings of once tantalizing rarity may be a brief
Google search away: while relatively few people may be able to own Jorge Ben’s
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influential 1967 album O Bidu: Silencio No Brooklyn (on vinyl or CD), anyone with an
internet connection can download it from Loronix, an MP3 blog. (This is not legal, but as
of this writing the link has been up four months.) Internet mediation, by putting
everything in one place (which is, of course, no one place) allows a purity of access
unanticipated by any library.
And yet “the elevated view” here follows the insight that music has become
“information.” Just what are these quotation marks questioning? To think of music as
mere data to be mined seems profoundly anti-humanistic, but Lyotard had warned that in
postmodernity information and access would override “deeper” principles. “The question
(overt or implied) now asked by the professionalist student, the State, or institutions of
higher education is no longer ‘Is this true?’ but ‘What use is it?’” (51). It goes without
saying that the same is true for commercial institutions, which of course provide most of
our music.
If Eisenberg is right and all things do aspire to the condition of music, how does
this gel with the essentially pragmatic contours of “information” in postmodernity? One
of Adorno’s complaints about the reproduction of Beethoven’s music through radio had
been that “What is heard is not Beethoven’s Fifth but merely musical information from
and about Beethoven’s Fifth” (“The Radio Symphony” 262). Thus if music becomes
information then it must be reduced to information.
So perhaps it is what gets “shatter[ed] to bits” in Eisenberg’s account that
warrants attention. While Eisenberg indicates that the objects themselves don’t matter,
one might read his prose differently by recalling Adorno’s remark, from “The Aging of
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the New Music,” that “Art, and above all music, is the effort to preserve in memory and
cultivate those split-off elements of truth that reality has handed over to the growing
domination of nature, to scientific and technological standards that permit no exceptions”
(192). Thus art and technology are rendered antipathetic, although Adorno does stress
that “authentic artists of this age” do indeed use technology in ways that foster “the
integral and transparent production of a nexus of meaning” (193).
Perhaps it has to be so: since technology inevitably cannibalizes everything, it
must become the basis of that which is “new” as well. This in a way was always true,
given the multifaceted meanings that can be applied to technology (as Adorno
acknowledges in “Opera and the Long-Playing Record,” the German equivalent Technik
also refers to technique). What Adorno is really after is getting away from the
contemporarily dominant forms of technology, or at least using these against their
purpose. “Theory,” he wrote in Minima Moralia, “must needs work with cross-grained,
opaque, unassimilated material, which as such has admittedly from the start an
anachronistic quality, but is not wholly obsolete since it has outwitted the historical
dynamic” (151).
Thus the Elgin marbles – records – may find new uses. To return to hip-hop: some
DJs do as Adorno would have theorists do, seeking out forgotten, anachronistic material.
But while they have the goal of “making it new” again, this inevitably takes the form of
assimilation. Thus when DJ Shadow samples a piano line from David Axelrod’s
otherwise forgotten 1968 album Songs of Experience on …Endtroducing… (1996), the
former is eventually reissued and canonized as a “classic” in its own right. This is
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characteristic of Fredric Jameson’s “nostalgia mode” in postmodernity: can anything
really escape the historical dynamic? Can anything avoid reduction to information?
By way of addressing these questions, I will consider the role of “ambience” in
music, both as an aesthetic (i.e. Brian Eno’s “ambient” recordings) and as a more
pernicious reality (i.e. Muzak and its use of songs to fill up spaces with overtly
commercial intent). In both cases, the original musical “text” is deemphasized; for
ambient music, this results in resignation; for Muzak, it results in an affirmation of
consumer culture which, in Adornian terms, would also be resignation.
To begin, one might consider Adorno’s own example of unassimilated musical
material, the music of Erik Satie. Satie’s “pert and puerile piano pieces . . . are flashes of
experience undreamed of by the school of Schönberg, with all its rigour and all the pathos
of musical development behind it” (Minima Moralia 151). What Satie saw that
Schoenberg didn’t, Adorno doesn’t articulate — the better, maybe, that listeners can
discover these flashes of experience themselves. But Satie himself seems to have wanted
his music to be as much an enigmatic presence as something to listen to:
You know, there’s a need to create furniture music, that is to say, music that
would be a part of the surrounding noises and that would take them into account. I
see it as melodious, as masking the clatter of knives and forks without drowning it
completely, without imposing itself. It would fill up the awkward silences that
occasionally descend on guests. It would spare them the usual banalities.
Moreover, it would neutralize the street noises that indiscreetly force themselves
into the picture (qtd. in Cox and Warner 63).
To envision music as furniture is to immediately assign it use value, and a use value in a
particularly domestic, probably bourgeois sphere at that: music that, by mingling with the
other sounds about, is not listened to for itself, for its own purely structural or melodic
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qualities (whether these are informed by the kind of social malaise Adorno perceived or
not). This would also be music that, by eliminating the need for small talk, arguably
diminishes social responsibility. The “usual banalities” are theoretically something we
shouldn’t miss, and yet perhaps they are necessary steps on the way to serious
conversation. So while Satie articulates a use value for music that would help us live
better — perhaps even allowing us the possibility of hearing all that surrounds us as
music, should we listen (to anticipate John Cage) —furniture music could contribute to
atomization. It might be that Adorno recognizes this, too, since he speaks of flashes of
experience.
Whether one experiences these flashes in the course of the dinner is open to
question, but in any case Satie foresaw the creation of a music made for “not listening
to.” Muzak is perhaps the name most often associated with “background music” and
aimed, by selecting music that lacked much range in dynamics or tempo, to subliminally
increase productivity, starting in the forties with the infamous “Stimulus Progression”
(Owen). No flashes there.
In the pop world, Brian Eno brought the idea a certain artistic credibility with his
“ambient” records of the seventies and eighties. While some of these albums have
pleasant, unobtrusive melodic content, their emphasis is on textural rather than tonal
qualities. (In this regard, Eno’s work takes after that of Pierre Schaeffer, who created
musique concrete. Adorno, as we saw in Chapter One, did not find what he heard
persuasive.) By this time, Eno argued, “Records and radio had been around long enough
for some of the novelty to wear off, and people were wanting to make quite particular and
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sophisticated choices about what they played in their homes and workplaces, what kind
of sonic mood they surrounded themselves with” (94). In his sleevenotes to Music for
Airports (1978), he wrote,
Whereas the extant canned music companies proceed from the basis of
regularizing environments by blanketing their acoustic and atmospheric
idiosyncrasies, Ambient Music is intended to enhance these. Whereas
conventional background music is produced by stripping away all sense of doubt
and uncertainty (and thus all genuine interest) from the music, Ambient Music
retains these qualities. And whereas their intention is to “brighten” the
environment by adding stimulus to it (thus supposedly alleviating the tedium of
routine tasks and leveling out the natural ups and downs of the body rhythms),
Ambient Music is intended to induce calm and a space to think.
Ambient music must be able to accommodate many levels of listening
attention without enforcing one in particular; it must be as ignorable as it is
interesting (qtd. in Eno 97).
Eno emphasizes the “unnatural” sonic manipulations of Muzak and its competitors
despite the fact that he is engaged in the same process – recording and manipulating
sounds – that they are. This is not to argue that Eno and Muzak are ultimately on the
same artistic level because they use the same media, but it is meant to show that both are
invested in conceiving of music to alter the hearer’s experience of a space. Adorno, who
emphasized repeatedly the intellectually nullifying effects of popular art forms, would
certainly approve of being offered “a space to think”; his enthusiasm for private listening
(recall his fondness for the archival properties of records in “Opera and the Long-Playing
Record”) suggests he might have shared some of Eno’s enthusiasm for exhibitions that
create such a space.
But calm alone can only have so much value, particularly for someone who
wanted us to recognize our alienation. Eno, writing of Music for Airports, said “I want to
make a kind of music that prepares you for dying – that doesn’t get all bright and cheerful
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and pretend you’re not a little apprehensive, but which makes you say to yourself,
‘Actually, it’s not that big a deal if I die’” (96). Eno’s music would not thwart but
actually encourage resignation – in the confines of a commercial institution, one that may
(if not deliberately) be the cause of death.
Of course, one might reasonably say that it is better to face and defuse your
anxiety than to ignore it. Furthermore, to think one’s life unimportant would seem to
reflect a non-reified consciousness, a rejection of ownership as Marx described it in his
1844 Manuscripts. “Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object
is only ours when we have it . . . in short, when it is used by us.” Instead of having a full
sensory and intellectual experience of something, “there has therefore come the sheer
estrangement of all these senses — the sense of having” (106). The recognition that one’s
life is finite makes the ownership and ontology of things fundamentally insignificant not
only because they are culturally constructed but because these constructions exist in time,
that is, historically. If one thinks of music as something de-reified, then one might be
more aware of one’s own nonidentity (to use Adorno’s term). The “environmental”
aspects of ambient music, given its enhancement of “idiosyncrasies,” theoretically
encourage us to hear things “for themselves” – even if the sounds themselves aren’t the
music per se.
Many of Eno’s ambient recordings are, in a sense, de-commodified: they consist
of unevenly-timed, overlapping loops – one thread of sound lasts thirty minutes, another
forty-seven, a third twenty-six, and so on – so that the piece can go on seemingly
indefinitely without repeating itself. Although things “reproduce” the music (a group of

37

CD players and speakers), it is possible that the music produced is never quite the same,
depending on when one hits the respective play buttons, or if one sets the players to
shuffle. While the music still consists of repetitions, the repetitions change in relationship
to each other.4 Some art installations Eno has assembled work in exactly this way,
emphasizing the spatial (as opposed to the material) qualities of the music.
However much such works may allow for listener agency, though, it’s hard not
to reflect upon how the “ambient” conception of music reflects a concession to the fact
that music isn’t necessarily “for listening” anymore and, in its lack of insistence on being
truly heard, becomes an invitation to unconsciousness as much as “a space to think” and
(as Eno suggests) to death. In Noise, Jacques Attali had spoken of how in the era of
records — of “repetition” — music, which had once been part and parcel with “ritual
sacrifice,” for him no longer served its social function, instead heralding an omnipresent
“threat of death” and silence (120).
[T]he triumph of capitalism, whether private or State, is not that it was able to trap
the desire to be different in the commodity, but rather that it went far beyond that,
making people accept identity in mass production as a collective refuge from
powerlessness and isolation. . . . For with records, as with all mass production,
security takes precedence over freedom; one knows nothing will happen because
the entire future is already laid out in advance. Identity then creates a mimicry of
desires and thus rivalry; and once again repetition encounters death (121).

4

The “mechanistic” aspect of this music is, of course, not new; it was anticipated, for
instance, in George Antheil’s 1924 Ballet Mechanique. Similarly, the aleatoric elements
of Eno’s music were anticipated by numerous composers, not least John Cage, whose
4’33” (1952) infamously consisted of the sounds surrounding the performer, not those
produced by any intentional musical instrument. What is significant about Eno’s efforts
here is their specific context in popular music – or to put it another way, they show that
the context of popular music is unclear, even if Muzak might seem more officially
“popular” as such. (Eno has co-produced several albums by U2, one of the world’s bestselling rock bands.)
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Noise was published in 1977; since then consumers have gained somewhat greater
agency in how they listen to music: most CD players are programmable and have shuffle
play; MP3 players allow listeners to create practically as many playlists, of whatever
length or type, as they desire. The future is seemingly no longer laid out in advance; one
can, theoretically, connect an iPod to a stranger’s computer, upload a new library of
music (albeit at the expense of one’s own) and have a completely new set of recordings to
listen to. Superficially, the future is full of possibilities.
However, the recordings themselves have already been manufactured,
predetermined. MP3 players and internet connections make the “stockpiling” Attali
referred to infinitely easier, allowing listeners to fill hard drives with thousands of hours
of unlistened-to music. Ultimately, the only agency is in being able to choose music you
“like”; the listener’s creative freedom is only marginally expanded, and “death” is just
delayed – or sustained – a little longer. In a sense it is telling that the ubiquity of the iPod,
differentiated only subtly by size, amount of storage, color, and video capability, replaces
more heterogeneous record and CD collections. There are practical reasons to prefer this,
notably liberated living space, ease of transport and fewer megatons of plastic destined
for landfills, but the cramming of the iPod seems to mirror the crammed sound of the
music on it: despite the device’s enormous capacity, its music (at least, if it has been
mastered in the iPod era) lacks dynamic space. In a way it is homogenous.
It is not so much ironic as appropriate that the Muzak corporation, no longer a
purveyor of “canned” (orchestrated, low-intensity, instrumental) versions of popular
songs, has essentially moved into the business of creating playlists, choosing from among
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a selection of 1.5 million recorded songs (this time the “original recordings”) to craft a
mixture that will appeal to the image particular retails want to uphold. An employee,
Dana McKelvey, explains:
The key is consistency. How did those songs connect? What story did they tell?
Why is this song after that song, and why is that one after that one? When we
make a program, we pay a lot of attention to the way songs segue. It’s not like
songs on the radio, or songs on a CD. Take Armani Exchange. Shoppers there are
looking for clothes that are hip and chic and cool. They’re twenty-five to thirtyfive years old, and they want something to wear to a party or a club, and as they
shop they want to feel like they’re already there. So you make the store sound like
the coolest bar in town. You think about that when you pick the songs, and you
pay special attention to the sequencing, and then you cross-fade and beat-match
and never break the momentum, because you want the program to sound like a
d.j.’s mix. . . . For Ann Taylor, you do something completely different. The Ann
Taylor woman is conservative, not edgy, and she really couldn’t care less about
segues. She wants everything bright and positive and optimistic and uplifting, so
you avoid offensive themes and lyrics, and you think about Sting and Celine
Dion, and you leave a tiny space between the songs or gradually fade out and fade
in (qtd. in Owen).
These remarks hail from David Owen’s New Yorker profile “The Soundtrack to Your
Life,” a title which implies that we live our lives, essentially, as consumers, and that our
identities are still very much fulfilled for us; as Attali suggests, we accept our identity in
mass production. McKelvey speaks of “the Ann Taylor woman” as if the latter existed —
and perhaps, at moments of perfect identification, in the changing room, she does. Ann
Taylor hires Muzak to help leave this identity construction as little up to chance as
possible. It is probably needless to point out that in smoothing out the differences
between songs Muzak employs dynamic range compression.
It’s a commonplace that dynamic range compression is a reflection of the
changing ways people listen to music. I have already mentioned the example of Autobahn
in the car; if one listens in an office space, on a bus with an iPod, or in other relatively
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noisy environments, having the levels more or less constant allows the listener to let the
music play on without having to adjust the volume. (If one uploads CDs from the eighties
and early nineties to iTunes, of course, the levels will vary considerably, but iTunes has a
“sound check” setting that partially ameliorates this difficulty.)
But then the question is whether the music is there to change one’s consciousness
(allowing for reflection, as Eno suggests) or if it’s meant to fill up aural space and not be
listened to. Setting iTunes to shuffle through thousands of songs makes the individual
songs function as advertisements for themselves (to borrow a phrase Adorno and
Horkheimer used in Dialectic of Enlightenment): a hook makes its way into one’s
consciousness, and the listener may think “I’ll have to listen to that some time,” even
though the music is actually present at the moment. I have had this experience, for
instance, when running: a song I downloaded without having listened to it appears via
shuffle play; because I am in an environment (the gym, on the bike path) where external
noise abounds, I can’t really listen to it, but only to hints of what it might be (a stray lyric,
a prominent synth line).
When mastering a recording for this kind of sound environment, the engineer
might well ask whether – if the point is to hook the listener – it’s worth bothering to
include “all the nuances” of the “original recording.” The “loudness wars” were
propagated for this very reason: listeners responded to a louder sound. As with
commercials on television, the sound needs to be adequately distracting, to get our
attention (although in an age where almost all popular music is mastered this way, this
becomes increasingly difficult).
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Adorno and George Simpson had written about the “distracting” elements of
pop songs in their 1941 essay “On Popular Music.”
Distraction is bound to the present mode of production, to the rationalized and
mechanized process of labor to which, directly or indirectly, masses are subject.
This mode of production, which engenders fears and anxiety about
unemployment, loss of income, war, has its “non-productive” correlate in
entertainment; that is, relaxation which does not involve the effort of
concentration at all. People want to have fun. A fully concentrated and conscious
experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put such a strain on
them that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort
simultaneously. The whole sphere of cheap commercial entertainment reflects this
dual desire. It reduces relaxation because it is patterned and pre-digested. Its being
patterned and pre-digested serves within the psychological household of the
masses to spare them the effort of that participation (even in listening or
observation) without which there can be no receptivity to art. On the other hand,
the stimuli they provide permit an escape from the boredom of mechanized labor
(458).
In the “post-industrial age” in which we supposedly live, one might argue that the “mode
of production” has changed and with it popular music. In a “service economy,” people
perform a greater variety of tasks, engage more with other human beings than with
machines — albeit through machines. Meanwhile, popular music, through its emphasis
on recording as opposed to composition or “arrangement” (Adorno argued that the latter
was most distinctive in pop) has gained a complexity of texture and historical
situatedness through its referencing of earlier songs and recordings, often explicitly in the
form of sampling. Both of these narratives admittedly oversimplify cultural changes in
the past sixty-five years, but they also beg the question of whether the rationalization and
mechanization of both work and popular music have changed significantly.
The rise of hip-hop in the eighties and nineties suggested the possibility that
popular music might increasingly be a work of postmodern pastiche, in which part of the
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“depth” of the music lay in recognizing the source material used. While for Jameson this
aesthetic would be a marker of a failure to recognize and understand our own historical
moment, the specifically political uses of sampling by groups like Public Enemy
suggested a sense of historical continuity, as with their use of James Brown and Afrika
Bambaata in “Fight the Power.” Public Enemy’s music was “distracting” in a way that
led to considerable public vitriol, and to argue that its central function was to help people
“have fun” — even given Rosie Perez’s exhilarating dancing over “Fight the Power” at
the beginning of Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing (1989) — would be a partial reading at
best. The commercial success of such music (the parent album Fear of a Black Planet
went platinum) might appear to indicate an audience that merely wants to look radical
(because it’s chic) or “just likes the beats,” but even if the listener ignores Chuck D’s
remarks about the racism of Elvis Presley and John Wayne (which admittedly would
probably not have alienated the average “gen Xer,” even as it brought the group
considerable media attention), the music itself retains an aggressive amelodicism that
remains fairly unusual and jarring in popular music. Musically and lyrically, while its
paean to collective consciousness might have struck Adorno as a form of
pseudoindividuality or even fascism, it is in many remarkably “cross-grained material.”
The layers of voices and sounds, sampled and otherwise, has been called cacophonous,
and it does create this impression even as production team the Bomb Squad’s mix is very
tightly controlled.
Since that time it has not been as common for overtly political, status quoflaunting music to make such an impression on the Billboard charts, and the aesthetic of
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hip-hop has in many ways smoothed out. While rappers continue to attract media
controversy, for instance over the misogyny of a Jay-Z or Eminem, those who would
attack the white-dominated status quo are receive little media attention. One of the most
widely praised hip-hop albums of the past decade, Australian DJ troupe the Avalanches’
Since I Left You (2000), has a party atmosphere that, on its sunny surface, is unlikely to
offend anyone. Being fashioned from a reported 3500 samples (Pytlik) from records,
films, and television shows, the layers of sound — crowd noises, vinyl crackle, bird and
water noises — often suggest a sea voyage, and each sample and track blends into the
next. This is a supremely distracting album, yet while its contents are more literally predigested than they ever could have been in Adorno’s time, the album nonetheless asks to
be listened to as a whole and has considerable range, dynamically and emotionally. The
music on this album rises and falls, to use the obvious simile, like the sea. (Comparisons
to Autobahn are obvious here, although the former is a far more placid, less busy
recording.) Each of the twenty tracks is not necessarily a “song,” and some serve mainly
as bridges between others. Consequently the album will suffer if put on shuffle on an
iPod, while sustaining extended listening. And if most of the content will serve admirably
for modern-day jitterbuggers (one of the lower levels in Adorno’s hierarchy of listeners),
there are also passages where sounds and tones take over and the beat disappears almost
entirely: a fog horn sounds out, the mood is pensive, the effect cinematic. And while
Since I Left You is only marginally a concept album, it does frame a narrative of sorts,
most charmingly articulated by the difference between its first sung couplet and its last:
from “Since I left you / I’ve found a world so new” to “I’ve been trying but I just can’t
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get you / Since the day I left you.” It is as if the album began by articulating its distance
and freedom from traditional albums, being as it consists of bits pillaged from other
people’s recordings, but ended by showing its fundamental nostalgia for the art form.
Since I Left You was an eagerly anticipated album and took some time to come
out due to the logistics of sample clearance, among other things. (These “party animals”
craft their work slowly; as of this writing their second album still has not appeared,
though it has been declared “almost finished” at least twice.) In order to satiate fans, the
group offered the Gimix megamix cassette, which previewed parts of the album while
including the catchier bits of some three dozen famous pop songs — “Billie Jean,” “Like
a Rolling Stone,” “I Can’t Go for That,” “Girls Just Want to Have Fun,” “A Roller
Skating Jam Called Saturdays.” For many listeners this has functioned as an alternate —
and better — version of the album itself, which goes to show just how vexed the question
of what the “original” work is: is Gimix a vast plagiarism of others’ work, and is Since I
Left You then a plagiarism of that work? Is there any authenticity in these gimmicks? The
original recordings by the artists sampled are so far removed from the resulting work
(with their tempo and pitch often adjusted to fit the flow of the mix) that the question of
what constitutes the work proper finally seems irrelevant. One poster on the I Love Music
forum poignantly described how the music affected him some years later:
I never had an mp3 of GIMIX back then for some reason, although I LOVE
LOVE LOVED Since I Left You. I just downloaded it off the site, and it’s
wonderful. I had an atrocious hangover on Saturday (and no sleep, due to my
ongoing futile attempts to combine fatherhood with going out occasionally) and
was getting the train to Southampton (to see us beat West Brom!!) generally
feeling like crap. And within minutes I was literally dancing (on the escalators at
Waterloo). My world was filled with sunshine and joy. I've rarely felt happier. It’s
ahistoricity actually seems to sum up it's era perfectly, that first
45

Napster/Audiogalaxy rush of file-sharing, all of musical history spread out for
your pleasure. So listening to it now is a kind of nostalgia for the permanent
present, which is a weird idea. It sounds so light of touch as well, (whereas
looking at the track list you would think it could be heavy-handed), and so light
and fizzy and bubbly in the sonics, all high end skipping over the bass/beat
fundamentals so you hardly notice they're there. Erm. I'm gushing rather (Smith).
For Adorno, an awareness of historical circumstances was crucial to understanding the
human condition: as he wrote in “Cultural Criticism and Society,” “The cultural critic . . .
speaks as if he represented either unadulterated nature or a higher historical stage. Yet he
is necessarily of the same essence as that to which he fancies himself superior” (19).
Perhaps taking his cue from Adorno, Jameson described the “nostalgia mode” in
Postmodernism as one that masked a deeper anxiety: a “desperate attempt to appropriate
a missing past” (19) in “a society bereft of all historicity” (18). There is a sense that the
society that cannot place itself adequately in some kind of historical narrative refuses
adulthood. It is difficult not to read Smith’s posting in this light: he cannot balance
fatherhood with more youthful pleasures, but he tries to anyway; the results have left him
unhappy, but for a moment — presumably for the forty-six minutes of Gimix — he is
euphoric, brought to a place out of time, on escalators no less. His champagne metaphors
are entirely appropriate to an album whose first spoken (as opposed to sung) words
entreat the listener to “get a drink, have a good time now,” adding “Welcome to
paradise!”
This invitation bespeaks the banality of commercial views of utopia, yet Gimix, as
Smith indicates, achieves something greater. It can be heard as anticipating a pop
fulfillment of Benjamin’s Jetztzeit, as articulated in the fourteenth of the “Theses on the
Philosophy of History.” Benjamin describes the experience of a movement in history as a
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repetition of an earlier one, as “to Robespierre ancient Rome was a past charged with the
time of the now which he blasted out of the continuum of history” (261). Similarly
enough, the Avalanches’ work — because none of the voices in it are those of the group’s
members, because they treat their source material, whatever the era, as essentially equal
— also builds a non-chronological continuum, where Dylan’s “Like a Rolling Stone” is a
perfect compliment to the bassline of Madonna’s “Holiday.”
That said, if “Origin is the goal,” as Karl Kraus’ epigram to Benjamin’s thesis
reads (261), it seems to be somewhat out of sight. Smith experiences nostalgia for the
permanent present, which does suggest an attempt to get at something fundamental — a
time that was somehow out of time. As we have seen, the “narrative” of Since I Left You
finally acknowledges its entrapment in time and expresses a certain regret. Gimix,
however, lacks this narrative arc: it retains “Since I’ve left you / I’ve found a world so
new” but not the “trying but I just can’t get you / since the day I left you” couplet that
close Since I Left You. One wonders if those who prefer the earlier version do so partly
because the escape it provides is more pure.

If celebrating intoxication, literal and otherwise, has been a feature of popular
music since long before postmodernity, one of the more distinct features of the present
era might be the celebration of — or at least fascination with — mundanity. Jamie
Thraves’ video for Róisín Murphy’s 2007 single “Overpowered” reflects both of these
concerns. It also serves as an analogy for contemporary atomized listening experiences.

47

Before turning to the video itself, it will be necessary to describe the recording.
“Overpowered” is a synth-driven, midtempo dance track employing a variety of textures,
from the dirty squelch of the bass to the bell-like tones that announce themselves at the
chorus. Murphy’s voice is double-tracked during the verses, where she describes desire as
a genetic process: “A chemical reason / If reason’s your game / A chemical needing / Is
there in the brain / With preprogrammed meanings / Like a little more pep / These alien
feelings / We have to accept.” Murphy sings these lines in a clipped, precise manner,
emphasizing the “logic” of attraction; the double-tracking (with no harmony) lends a
slightly robotic quality to the voice. At the chorus, the voice appears to “blossom,”
single-tracked, into earnest expression: “When I think that I’m over you / I’m
overpowered,” lingering on the “you.” The first repeat of the chorus adds a further
couplet, this time double-tracked again: “As science struggles on to try and explain /
Oxy-toxins flowing ever into my brain,” where the more emotive voice is merged with
the objective one. Flowing upward strokes on a harp (or some synthetic equivalent)
accompany this moment, and heavenly laws become one with those of science, which
must nonetheless struggle with the sheer unreason of desire.
The effect is supposed to beguile, and certainly some listeners have responded
accordingly: “she write with new words and xpression used on the web and teknology
science and marketing in a beautifull way!! when i heard her music i feel overpowered!”
(Riccio). Spelling and syntax aside, this conveys pretty well the minutiae that make the
song distinctive; relatively few songs reference oxy-toxins or rationalize desire in quite so
literal a way, even though rationalizing overpowering passions is the business of a great
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deal of pop music. The specifically technological aspect of the recording – reverberant,
retro-futurist synth sounds – suggest a cyborg romance. This sort of imagery is not new to
Murphy – seventies albums by David Bowie and Kraftwerk romanticized machines
extensively, and new wave followed in their wake – but this is nonetheless part of what
makes Murphy “distinctive” at this particular moment. While the sounds and certainly the
structure are not notably so different from other popular contemporary dance tracks, it is
the “idiosyncrasies” that make the recording distinctive. At the same time, because these
features are constructed in such a deliberate way, they are not really – at least not fully –
idiosyncratic. This is essentially Adorno’s critique of pseudo-individualization: in
popular music (in this context, jazz),
the detail remains openly connected with the underlying scheme so that the
listener always feels on safe ground. The choice in individual alterations is so
small that the perpetual recurrence of the same variations is a reassuring signpost
of the identical behind them. [There is also] the function of “substitution” – the
improvisatory features forbid their being grasped as musical events in themselves.
They can be received only as embellishments. It is a well-known fact that in
daring jazz arrangements worried notes, dirty tones, in other words, false notes,
play a conspicuous role. They are apperceived as exciting stimuli only because
they are corrected by the ear to the right note (Adorno and Simpson 446).
The same might be said for the more peculiar sonic textures in “Overpowered.” Such
features, of course, account for much of the pleasure in popular music; if we deny them,
then we essentially have to side with Adorno and conclude that pop has no real value. To
oppose this position, it helps to value fun, which Adorno and Horkheimer famously
denigrated as “a medicinal bath” (1231). “[T]he ‘escape’ provided by popular music
actually subjects the individuals to the very same social powers from which they want to
escape”; this results in “fury” and an inevitable backlash against what was seemingly
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loved when it was new (Adorno and Simpson 462-463). But this does not have to be the
case, as popular music has developed a much stronger canon formation by now than it
had in Adorno’s time, while the resurrection of “forgotten” artists and styles is crucial to
the fabric of postmodern music. Fans may be tools of the market to some degree, but the
more devoted among them follow the artist before the market, even if it is the market that
provides the map to follow the artist. And so those who liked Murphy’s work as half of
the electronic duo Moloko might well follow her through her solo career.
But as cleverly assembled as “Overpowered” is, the use of dynamic range
compression arguably limits its potential for pleasure. The recording is not as
aggressively mastered as some, but when the song sounds like it is “supposed” to hit a
peak in volume – “As science struggles…” – there is no actual increase, because most of
the space in the waveform has already been filled, despite the doubling of Murphy’s
voice and the addition of the harp. Even as Murphy sings of oxy-toxins filling her brain,
“science struggles” to create an impression of increased intensity in a space that is
already crammed with sound. In order to be beguiled the listener has to imagine that the
volume has increased, somewhat as Adorno and Simpson’s jazz fans “correct” “false
notes” – with the difference that the false notes are what make the performance or
recording distinctive, while dynamic range compression eliminates distinctions.
In typically ironic postmodern fashion, Thraves’ video undermines the song’s
appeal to incessant desire through its “quirky” presentation of Murphy’s postperformance journey home. The film opens with Murphy at the end of a concert. She
bows to the crowd, receives hugs from people backstage, and makes her way for the
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dressing room. Rather than attend some lavish and decadent post-concert party, she takes
the bus, stops for fast food, goes home, puts laundry in, brushes her teeth while sitting on
the toilet, and finally simply goes to bed. All the while, she wears her Gareth Pughdesigned, checker-patterned, shiny dress and a pointed, vaguely bird-shaped hat. She
removes neither of these articles even when going to bed. Thus the video plays on
expectations of what pop stars “should” do by showing her behaving more or less like as
anyone who had just finished a job would, the only difference being that she never
abandons her flamboyant costume.
What is odd about this is that the video seems to articulate a desire to escape the
music. The “performance” portion of the video ends as the song begins, yet the
soundtrack suggests that the music is actually being played, since we hear the noises of
the crowd. When Murphy closes her dressing room door, the sound of the song is muted.
At this point Murphy could receive visitors, meet some object of desire, or she could
“sing” the song to the viewer. But most of what follows does not hint at any desire
greater than that for the costume. As she walks home, Murphy briefly encounters a
couple in embrace, but this is incidental – a tease, perhaps, or a sign that such pleasures
are actually pretty banal themselves. Apart from a brief moment when Murphy smilingly
speaks with the fast food employees, she does not engage with other people; the drunk
who plops down beside her on the bus, oblivious to her costume like everyone else, is
naturally enough a minor irritant. The song does not transport, does not overpower her or
anyone present. The images do not even appear to need the song, apart from their
promotional function (though Murphy does walk roughly in step with the beat). After the
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performance footage, there is relatively little evidence of fun onscreen, even if viewers
can enjoy the eccentric attachment to costume.5
So while Smith experienced a complete identification with Gimix as he danced
on escalators, Murphy in her video is like the atomized listener who simply has the music
on and does not listen to it. She is the creator of the work – the source of its voice – but
does not connect with it. She is attached to the trappings of her performance – her
costume – as if it were the chief sign of authenticity, the chief means of ownership. In a
promotional interview for EMI, Murphy said the “Overpowered” video showed
kind of the loneliness and the mundanity of actually what it is to be a flamboyant,
eh, performer, you know? And my life is often very mundane. The visual side of
it shows something that I do believe in, which is flamboyance. And kind of
showing off isn’t necessarily a lie, it’s not necessarily a façade. Sometimes it’s
just an extension of actually the truth. And for me, certainly when I’m performing
on stage, the way I use costume and lighting and dramatic effect, those are just
extensions of who I truly am, they’re not lies (Murphy).
To complain that spectacle is emphasized at the expense of the music here would hardly
be to register a new criticism; nor would it be particularly relevant. I do not mean to
suggest that Murphy’s music, in itself, is “bad” or that it is undermined by the images that
promote it. Rather I mean to suggest that the very lack of an “in itself” is what
problematizes the work. In popular music, the mastery that escapes the listener – in the
form of the ability to master the recording itself, since this has been done by someone
else, often hidden from view – can both make it vital and undermine it. Flamboyance can

5

They may also feel flattered that Murphy takes the same kind of route home that they
do. That the video opens with a drop of sweat falling from Murphy’s face and bursting on
the stage floor suggests that this performance is, after all, a job – hard work. But to the
extent that this undermines the song’s fantasy of desire, it cannot do so without
fetishizing something else: the costume.
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easily be “authentic” because it has no de facto content, but the current employment of
the means of production does not guarantee this flamboyance will be given full range.
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CODA

Two years ago I inherited my first iPod from my father, who had bought himself
a newer model. At first when he offered me the player, I was not interested: I was
attached to the album as an object and devoted to maintaining a real, not a virtual library,
and I had seen my father’s CD collection collecting dust downstairs (to say nothing of the
LPs warping in the basement). Furthermore, I liked my music in the open air, not plugged
into my head: real speakers both seemed less antisocial and gave me ownership of the
spaces they occupied — for instance, the kitchen. Growing up, I was the resident dishdoer, and my parents tolerated my taking forty-five minutes to do a job they would have
accomplished in ten. They stayed out of my way for the most part as I sang, danced
(disastrously for the occasional glass or plate) and read liner notes. Perhaps they
understood, as well or better than I, that this was the only exercise I was getting at the
time.
Ten years later, living with my parents again and working as a special education
aide at the high school I had attended, I had plenty of time to ask myself how much
progress I had made in the intervening years. Despite having a fairly successful
undergraduate career behind me, including a year abroad, the answer seemed to be “not
much.” (If Adorno was concerned about a regression of listening, I was concerned about
a wholesale regression of being.) Something needed to change, and while grad school
was pending it wasn’t guaranteed. So I decided to accept my father’s iPod offer after all
and take up running: if I couldn’t improve my mind, perhaps I could improve my body
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— though I struggled to unthink this dichotomy, especially in my most heaving moments.
Through this exercise I came to embrace the iPod, which to date has not supplanted but
supplemented my “physical” collection, while diminishing an awful self-consciousness
about my own physicality.
iPods are emblematic of mobility, and mobility means being surrounded by
noise, so these devices need to drown that other noise out. Consequently, the more
steadily loud the music is, the better. Despite the sound check function mentioned in
Chapter Two, iPods can’t fully match up the volume of older recordings with newer,
more dynamically compressed ones, probably because the peak levels of the older
recordings are about equal to the average levels of the newer ones. Consequently when I
went running across the meadow out beyond my parents’ backyard, I experienced
significant variation in volume when I set the player to shuffle (generally my preferred
listening mode: when I run, whatever little thing that makes the future seem like it’s not
laid out in advance, to recall Attali – even if it actually is – helps).
So when running, subtlety is not the point. In fact, some of the music that
sounded best on the player was that which (like a pop ambient music) had an absorbent
quality, for which the sounds outside my head might just as well have been one with
those emerging from the earbuds. This was particularly true when a track from the 2006
reissue of a 1983 Lizzy Mercier Descloux album, Zulu Rock (originally self-titled), came
on. Zulu Rock is one of several Western-artists-in-South-Africa albums of the eighties
that included Paul Simon’s Graceland (1986) and Mick Fleetwood’s The Visitor (1981),
but Descloux’s sounded more vibrant than the competition to me, perhaps because her
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voice was already raspy from years of smoking, perhaps because she didn’t seem merely
nice about it, because she seemed genuinely enthusiastic and, well, exotic herself: singing
in French, in English, whispering and yelling over the horns, clackety percussion, and
guitar.
This reissue is the only version of the album I had ever heard, so I have nothing
to compare it to, but the remastering certainly does stretch reverb out over all the
instruments and vocals so that they blend; when running, it really was difficult at times to
distinguish Descloux’s vocals from the other instruments (say, the clicking of her tongue
from the percussion) or even from the birdsong over my head. Dynamic range
compression appeared to be in full effect.
After I’d been in graduate school a year and, with great pride in my boldness,
taken myself out in public to do my running, I was still enchanted when Descloux’s
music appeared, even if I’d been reading my Adorno that day and should have known
better. I would be particularly gleeful if “All the Same,” the album’s buoyant closer,
came on, and Descloux sang
The moon and the sun are the same
The shadow and the light are the same
But you and me, we are not the same
But you and me, we will never be the same.
Except, of course, that it was not Descloux singing, but a representation of her voice,
removed how many times I don’t know. As heard on my MP3s, through my earbuds, the
sounds did all become the same, both those on the recording and those around me. At the
same time, Descloux was different, separated from herself and from me, both by the
boundaries of technology and those of mortality (she died in 2004). And as I grew more
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accustomed to the particular patch of pavement I was running on, I hoped that I would
never be the same, either.
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